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Using a panel of 79,841 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007, we examine the extent to which 
liquidity constraints affect firms‟ assets growth. We find that state owned enterprises are not affected, 
while the availability of internal finance represents a binding constraint for the growth of private firms, 
especially those operating in coastal regions, with negligible foreign ownership. Thanks to their high 
productivity, cash flow is, however, so abundant for these firms that they are able to grow at a very fast 
rate,  despite  being  discriminated  against  by  financial  institutions.  Hence,  well  developed  external 
capital markets may not always be needed for fast economic growth.  
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1.  Introduction 
Over  the  period  2000-2007,  Chinese  firms  achieved  very  high  growth  rates  and 
generated large cash flow streams: their average assets growth was 8.6% and their 
average cash flow to total assets ratio, 8.05%
1. Are these two features related? And if 
so, what is the nature of the link that connects them? Our paper seeks to answer these 
questions. 
We  provide  a  meaningful  contribution  to  the  literature  on  finance  and 
economic  growth.  Numerous  papers  in  this  literature  have  used  m acro  data  to 
investigate the links between  broad measures of  financial development and growth, 
and generally found a positive relationship (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). Yet, 
China is a counterexample to these findings : in spite of a malfunctioning financial 
system, it has one of the fastest growing economies (Allen at al., 2005). The present 
paper helps to rationalize this puzzle (which we denote hereafter as the Chinese 
growth puzzle) by investigating the role played b y the availability of internally 
generated funds in determining firm-level growth
2.  
Our research also relates to the  literature on financing constraints and firm 
behavior. In recent  years, a number of papers have  analyzed  the extent to which 
measures of internal finance (such as  cash flow)  affect  firm  investment in fixed 
capital, inventories, or R&D, which can be seen as specific components of firm 
growth.  Most  of  these  studies  interpret  a  positive  link  between  cash  flow  and 
investment as an indicator of financial constraints
3. A financially constrained firm, for 
which it is difficult or too expensive to obtain external finance, will in fact only invest 
if it has sufficient internal funds, and will be forced to reduce its investment , and 
hence its growth, following drops in its cash flow.  
                                                 
1 These figures are obtained from our dataset, which is a large-scale enterprise survey conducted by the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and covering all state owned enterprises and other types 
of  enterprises  with  annual  sales  of  five  million  yuan  (about  $650,000)  or  more.  This  dataset  is 
thoroughly described in Section 3. Throughout the paper, we will refer to firm assets growth and firm 
growth interchangeably. It should be noted, however, that for firms having over-capacity in assets, 
output growth (which is what is often referred to as firm growth) may not necessarily require assets 
growth. 
2 To the best of our knowledge, this approach, which was pioneered in 2002 by Carpenter and Petersen 
who applied it to small US listed firms, has never been used with reference to a developing country. 
See Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) for an application to Belgium and Slovenia. Hereafter, we will use 
the terms internal finance, internally generated funds, and cash flow, interchangeably. 
3  This view (the financing constraints hypothesis) has, however, been challenged by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Cummins et al. (2006). See Schiantarelli (1995), Hubbard ( 1998), 
and Bond and Van Reenen  (2007), for surveys of the literature on financing constraints and firm 
behavior.   3 
Given the heterogeneity that characterizes it, the Chinese economy represents 
an ideal laboratory for testing the financing constraints hypothesis. It contains in fact 
several types of firms, likely to face very different degrees of credit constraints. The 
two extreme groups are the state owned and the private enterprises. Because of their 
need to respond to both political and social stresses, as well as to economic objectives, 
the state owned enterprises (SOEs) typically experience soft budget constraints, and 
are able to obtain large amounts of loans from the banking system, despite their low 
profitability (Bai et al., 2006). These firms are therefore unlikely to face any financial 
constraints, and we do not expect their growth to be significantly affected by their 
internally  generated  funds.  Private  firms,  on  the  other  hand,  make  up  the  largest 
group,  and  constitute  the  engine  of  growth  of  the  Chinese  economy,  with  assets 
growth rates in excess of 8%. Yet, these firms are typically discriminated against in 
terms  of  access  to  external  funding  (Allen  et  al.,  2005)
4.  For  these  financially 
constrained firms, the ability to generate high cash flow streams may have played a 
significant role in financing their spectacular growth rates. 
       Despite China being a very interesting case study, o nly a handful of papers 
attempted to test whether the financing constraints hypothesis holds for Chinese firms 
(Chow and Fung, 1998, 2000; Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; Poncet et al., 2010). These 
studies are based on datasets made up of relatively small numbers of firms, which are 
typically not representative of the population of Chinese firms and are likely to suffer 
from serious sample selection bias. 
We contribute to this literature in  four important ways. First,  we use a very 
large and relatively unexplored dataset, compiled by the Chinese NBS over the period 
2000-2007, and made up of 79,841 unlisted manufacturing and mining firms, which 
sum up to 499,001 observations. This dataset includes a large proportion of small and 
young firms, which are particularly likely to suffer from liquidity constraints. It 
                                                 
4 Until 1998, state owned commercial banks were instructed to lend only to state owned enterprises. 
The system was liberalized at the end of 1990s, when the Chinese Constitution acknowledged the 
private sector to be an integral part of the economy, and theoretically it is not in place any more. 
However, in practice, banks still consider private enterprises to be riskier than their public peers due to 
their short credit history and lower chance of being bailed out by the government. Evidence for this is 
given  in  World  Bank  (2003),  which  documents  that  over  the  period  1997-2000,  only  12%  of  the 
working capital of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (which are mainly private) came from 
bank  loans.  As  a  result  of  this  bank  discrimination,  the  strongest  determinant  of  the  allocation  of 
investment funds in China appears to be the prominence of SOEs in local economies (World Bank, 
2005). Given the low productivity of SOEs, this means that capital is typically allocated away from the 
most productive regions and towards the least productive ones. World Bank (2005) also documents that 
the share of SOEs in local industries has a clear positive and statistically significant effect on the size of 
investment financed by bank loans in these industries.   4 
provides us with a unique opportunity to carry out much sharper tests of the financing 
constraints  hypothesis  than  those  typically  performed  in  the  literature,  which  are 
mostly based on samples of relatively healthy listed US or UK firms
5. To the best of 
our knowledge, the financing constraints hypothesis has never been tested using such 
a comprehensive dataset
6.  
Second, unlike Chow and Fung (1998, 2000), Héricourt and Poncet (2009), 
and Poncet et al. (2010), who only concentrate on firms‟ investment, we focus on the 
growth of firms‟ total assets, which encompasses all possible uses of cash flow. For 
financially constrained firms, we predict a relationship between internal finance and 
assets growth of the order of one-for-one. Considering the phenomenal growth that 
has  characterized  Chinese  firms  in  recent  years,  in  spite  of  a  poorly  developed 
financial system, this represents a meaningful contribution.  
Third,  for  the  first  time  in  the  Chinese  context,  we  investigate  whether 
different categories of private firms face different degrees of financing constraints.  
Finally, for the first time in the literature, we compute and analyze firm-level 
assets  growth  to  cash  flow  sensitivities,  with  the  aim  of  assessing  whether 
simultaneous pervasive credit constraints (proxied by high cash flow sensitivities) and 
high growth may induce efficiency losses, which could reduce the potential for future 
growth. 
We find that the growth of SOEs‟ and collective firms‟ assets is not affected 
by the availability of cash flow, while that of private and foreign owned firms is most 
affected. These results are robust to accounting for investment opportunities in several 
ways,  to  considering  assets  growth  net  of  cash,  and  to  defining  our  ownership 
categories in different ways. We also find evidence of heterogeneity across private 
firms: it is those private firms that operate in the coastal regions and have negligible 
foreign ownership that are most affected by financing constraints. Furthermore, we 
find that those private firms characterized by high sensitivities of assets growth to 
                                                 
5 Most of the studies based on US data make use of Compustat, while studies based on the UK make 
use of Datastream. Only a few papers in the literature have tested the financing constraints hypothesis 
using panels containing unlisted firms (see for instance Benito, 2005, and Guariglia, 2008), but their 
datasets are generally much smaller than ours. 
6 Another advantage of our dataset is that it contains a continuous measure of ownership, based on the 
fraction of the firms‟ total capital paid in by various agents. This variable gives a better picture of the 
firms‟ ownership than the time-invariant registration codes used in Poncet et al. (2010); the subjective 
assessment of the firms‟ ownership provided at one point in time by the firms‟ managers, used in 
Héricourt  and  Poncet  (2009);  or  the  four  broad  ownership  categories  (state-owned  enterprises, 
collectively-owned enterprises, international joint-ventures, and other enterprises) used in Chow and 
Fung (1998, 2000).    5 
cash flow (i.e. by a high degree of financing constraints) and rapid growth display 
higher cash flow than their counterparts with low sensitivities. This suggests that these 
firms use internal funds to finance their growth. Yet, the accumulation of high cash 
flow does not occur at the expense of wages and training expenses. The simultaneous 
presence  of  credit  constraints  and  high  growth  is  therefore  unlikely  to  induce 
significant  efficiency  losses.  Finally,  we  find  that  firms  characterized  by  high 
sensitivities of assets growth to cash flow and high growth display high productivity 
and productivity growth, suggesting that high productivity may be key in explaining 
how these firms manage to accumulate the high cash flow that enables them to grow 
despite heavy financing constraints.   
Considering  that  private  firms  make  up  on  average  about  64%  of  the 
observations in our sample, the Chinese miracle, which was driven by these highly 
productive  firms,  may  have  been  made  possible  by  their  ability  to  generate  vast 
amounts of internal funds, which enabled them to grow, in spite of their inability to 
obtain external finance. Hence, high growth rates may be compatible with binding 
financing constraints as long as there are sufficient levels of internal finance.  
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the links 
between finance and growth in China, both from a macro and a micro perspective. 
Section 3 describes our dataset and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 
illustrates our baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 5 describes 
our main empirical findings and the results of some robustness tests and extensions. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Links between finance and growth in China 
 
2.1  A macro perspective 
A  number  of  studies  use  provincial  level  panel  data,  over  different  time  periods 
ranging  between  1985  and  2003,  to  analyze  the  relationship  between  financial 
development and economic growth in China, in an attempt to understand the Chinese 
growth puzzle. They reach contrasting conclusions: some papers find a positive link 
(e.g.  Cheng  and  Degryse,  2010),  others  document  a  negative  link  (e.g.  Boyreau-
Debray,  2003),  and  others  no  link  at  all  (e.g.  Aziz  and  Duenwald,  2002).  These 
studies  make  use  of  different  financial  indicators,  and  different  econometric 
techniques,  and  focus  on  different  time  periods,  which  might  explain  their  mixed   6 
results. Yet, provincial data do not permit a full understanding of the relationship 
between finance and growth in China, as they ignore the considerable heterogeneity 
characterizing individual Chinese firms. Studies based on micro data are therefore 
necessary for this purpose.  
 
2.2  A micro perspective 
Other studies adopt a micro perspective and use firm-level data to understand the links 
between finance and growth in China. Among these, a group of papers look at the 
relationship between specific sources of external finance and firm growth; another at 
the  links  between  financial  variables  and  investment  in  fixed  capital  (which  is  a 
significant component of firm growth).  
Within the first group, Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2009) focus on firm-
level data to explain the high growth rates experienced in China, in spite of a poorly 
developed financial system. The former rely on the World Bank Investment Climate 
Survey dataset, which covers 2400 Chinese firms across 18 different cities, over the 
period 2000-2003. The authors show that a relatively small percentage of firms in 
their sample use formal bank finance, while reliance on informal finance is much 
stronger. They then question whether it is non-standard financing mechanisms that 
promote growth in China, but are unable to find conclusive evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis. Cull et al. (2009), on the other hand, use data drawn from the annual 
accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the NBS to investigate whether trade 
credit  could  have  been  what  financed  China‟s  spectacular  growth,  in  spite  of  its 
malfunctioning  financial  system.  They  conclude  that  trade  credit  did  not  play  a 
significant  role  in  explaining  China‟s  growth
7.  Neither  of  these  studies  provides 
therefore a solution to the Chinese growth puzzle.  
Among the second group of papers, Chow and Fung (1998) study the relationship 
between  investment  and  cash  flow  using  a  panel  of  5825  manufacturing  firms 
operating in Shanghai over the period 1989-1992, with the objective of testing the 
financing constraints hypothesis. They find that firms‟ investment is constrained by 
cash flow, and that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is highest for private 
firms  and  lowest  for  foreign  owned  firms.  State  owned  and  collective  firms  also 
exhibit positive sensitivities, higher for the former. Chow and Fung (2000) exploit the 
                                                 
7 Allen et al. (2008) reach a similar conclusion in a recent study of the financial system capacities of 
China and India.   7 
same data set  as  Chow and Fung (1998)  and, focusing once again  on investment 
equations, show that small firms exhibit lower sensitivities of investment to cash flow 
than large firms. They explain this finding considering that small firms are dominated 
by non-state, fast growing enterprises, which may be using their working capital to 
smooth their fixed investment. Using an Euler equation framework and data from 
1300 firms operating in 18 Chinese cities, and 14,967 firms operating over the entire 
Chinese territory, respectively, Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet et al. (2010) 
show  that,  contrary  to  SOEs,  private  firms‟  investment  is  strongly  affected  by 
financial variables. These studies suggest that as cash flow plays an important role in 
determining firm investment, it is also likely to affect firm growth
8. 
We provide a synthesis between these two groups of studies. Our paper connects 
with Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2009), in the sense that it also uses firm-
level data to analyze firm growth. Yet, instead of focusing on the actual links between 
growth and specific sources of external finance, it  follows the approach of the 
investment literature by assessing the extent to which firms‟ assets growth is affected 
by the availability of internal finance (proxied by cash flow). As in the investment 
literature,  a  strong  dependence  of  assets  growth  on  cash  flow  can  be  seen  as  an 
indicator of financing constraints. If, following a decline in its internal funds, a firm is 
forced to reduce its growth (by reducing, for instance, its investment in fixed capital 
and/or working capital), one can infer that the firm finds it difficult to access external 
finance.  
Yet, these financial constraints could be accompanied by increasing growth rates 
for firms with good investment prospects, able to generate large amounts of internal 
funds. This could have been the case for Chinese private firms and could explain why, 
in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, China has one of the fastest growing 
economies, and can be seen as a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth 
literature (Allen et al., 2005). The Chinese miracle could in fact have been driven by 
highly profitable private firms, which were able to finance high growth levels only 
through their retained earnings. High growth rates may hence be compatible with 
binding financial constraints, as long as firms have sufficiently high levels of internal 
finance. 
 
                                                 
8 Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet et al. (2010) use an Euler equation framework, and include 
the leverage ratio and the coverage ratio as their main financial variables.   8 
 
3.  Data and summary statistics 
 
3.1  Data 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with 
the NBS over the period 2000-2007. All state-owned enterprises and other types of 
enterprises  with  annual  sales  of  five  million  yuan  (about  $650,000)  or  more  are 
covered. These firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and come from 
31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. We dropped observations with 
negative sales; as well as observations with negative total assets minus total fixed 
assets; total assets minus liquid assets; and accumulated depreciation minus current 
depreciation.  Firms  that  did  not  have  complete  records  on  our  main  regression 
variables were also dropped. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we 
excluded observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. 
Finally, we dropped all firms with less than 5 years of consecutive observations
9. Our 
final panel covers 79,841 mainly unlisted firms, which corresponds to 499,001 firm -
year observations
10. It is unbalanced, with number of observations ranging from a 
minimum of 39,781 in 2000 to a maximum of 72,296 in 2003
11. 
  The NBS data contains a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on 
the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors, namely 
the state; foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Maca o, and Taiwan); 
investors from  Hong  Kong, Macao,  and Taiwan ;  legal entities;  individuals;  and 
collective investors. The rationale for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those from other parts of the world is that  the former 
capture the so-called “round-tripping” foreign direct investment, whereby domestic 
firms may register as foreign invested firms from nearby regions to take advantage of 
the benefits (such as tax and legal benefits) granted to foreign invested firms (Huang, 
                                                 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this. Our results were robust to including firms with 3 
and 4 years of consecutive observations. Also note that between 2000 and 2007, we observe entry of 
new firms, and exit of existing firms from the sample. These decisions are potentially not random and 
could bias our results. Our findings were generally robust to using a balanced panel in estimation. 
10 The Chinese NBS dataset does not allow separate identification of publicly listed companies in 
China. Specifically, it is difficult to track these companies as their legal identification numbers we re 
changed as they went public (Liu and Xiao, 2004). Over the period considered, there were slightly 
more than 1000 listed companies operating in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This amounts to 
less than 0.3% of the total number of firms in our sample. 
11 See Appendix 1 for details about the structure of our panel and about China‟s provincial units and 
regions; as well as for complete definitions of all variables used.   9 
2003). Ownership by legal persons is a mixture of ownership by state legal persons 
and private legal persons
12, which represents a form of corporate ownership. Finally, 
collective firms are typically owned collectively by  communities in  urban or rural 
areas  (the latter are kno wn as Township  and Village  Enterprises or TVEs)  and 
managed by local governments. 
We grouped all foreign owned firms (from Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and 
other parts of the world) into a single category (which we labe lled foreign); and all 
firms  owned  by  legal  entities,  and  individuals  into  a  single  category  (labelled 
private)
13.  We  then  classified  our  firms  into  state  owned,  foreign,  private,  and 
collective, based on the shares  of paid-in-capital contributed by our  four types of 
investors in each year. Specifically, we classified firms according to majority average 
ownership shares. For instance, we classified a firm as foreign owned in a given year 
if the share of its capital owned by foreign investors  in that year is at least 50% (see 
Ayyagari et al., 2008; and Dollar and Wei, 2007, for a similar approach)
 14.  
  Table 1 presents the distribution of our observations by ownership type and 
year. We can see that the composition of our sample underwent considerable changes 
over the period 2000-2007. In particular, the share of the sample comprised by SOEs 
has declined from 13.4% in 2000 to just 4.2% in 2007, while the share comprised by 
private  investors  has  increased  from  45.7%  to  70.6%  over  the  same  period,  as  a 
consequence of an ongoing process of privatization. The share of collectively owned 
firms also suffered a significant decline, from 20.9% to 7.2%. Collective enterprises 
                                                 
12  Legal  persons  represent  a  mix  of  various  domestic  institutions,  such  as  industrial  enterprises, 
construction and real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, securities 
companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research 
institutions etc. 
13 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent 64% of the total. As firms owned by legal 
persons include firms owned by state legal persons, one could question their inclusion in the  private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state‟s primary interest is mainly political (i.e. 
aimed at maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal persons are 
profit-oriented (Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and 
non-state legal persons, we were unable to exclude the former from our private category. All our results 
were, however, robust to excluding all firms owned by legal persons from the private category.  
14 We derived ownership categories on the basis of the fraction of capital paid in by the various groups 
in every year, rather than using registration codes. Registration codes are in fact not entirely reliable, as 
they are updated only with considerable delay (Dollar and Wei, 2007). Moreover, firms might have an 
incentive to  falsely register as foreign simply to take advantage of the tax benefits accorded to the 
latter. All our results were robust to using registration -based ownership categories. Note that our way 
of  classifying  firms  into  ownership  groups  leads  to  excluding  f rom  our  sample  those  firms 
characterized by mixed ownership, whereby no group has a majority share. For instance, a firm 
characterized by a 40% private ownership, a 30% state ownership, and a 30% foreign ownership would 
automatically be excluded from our sample. Firms characterized by this type of mixed ownership only 
make up 1.5% of our sample.   10 
were extremely successful in the 1980s, and were typically granted tax advantages 
and easy bank loans (Byrd and Lin, 1990). Yet, in the 1990s, due to the increased 
competition by private firms and to the banking reforms, whereby banks started to 
scrutinize loan applications more carefully, these enterprises experienced declining 
profitability, and a slowdown in their growth. Reforming their ownership structure 
became a priority to reverse these trends (Song, 1990; Ho et al., 2003). Finally, the 
share comprised by foreign investors remained largely constant at around 18-20% 
between 2000 and 2007.  
  As  our  objective  in  this  paper  is  not  the  study  of  the  effects  of  firms‟ 
transitions from state owned to private or foreign,  and to minimize the effects of 
measurement error in the ownership variables, in our subsequent analysis, we make 
use of time-invariant measures of ownership. Hence, we classify firms into our four 
ownership categories, based on majority average ownership shares calculated over the 
sample period. 
 
3.2  Summary statistics 
In our empirical analysis, we focus on firm-level growth defined as the growth of 
firms‟ total assets. Total assets include tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, 
other fixed assets, accounts receivable, inventories; and other current assets (the main 
component of which is cash and equivalents). Table 2 shows the composition of total 
assets  by  ownership  types
15.  The share of the total assets of SOEs made up by 
tangibles (39.6%) is much higher than the corresponding average share for the other 
three  ownership  group s  (32.5%).  This  can  be  explained  by  the  overinvestment 
behavior that  has historically  characterized  Chinese SOEs  (Qin and Song, 200 9). 
SOEs also have  lower shares of accounts receivable and  inventories:  13.9%  and 
18.8%, compared to averages of 20.0% and 20.3% for the other groups. This suggests 
that  SOEs  are  fairly  different  from  other  ownership  types  in  terms  of  assets 
composition. 
  Table 3 presents sample means and medians for a number of variables for our 
four ownership types. Once again, we see that SOEs are  notably different from the 
other groups. Specifically, they exhibit very low growth rates: their mean assets 
                                                 
15 Because the years 2000 and 2001 are used to construct lagged values of the variables that appear in 
our estimating equations (see Section 4.1 for details), our regression results are only based on the years 
2002 to 2007. To ensure compatibility between the data used in the regressions and those used in the 
descriptive statistics, Tables 2 and 3 also refer to the period 2002-2007.    11 
growth is 1.0%, compared to an average of 7.3% for the other three groups; their 
average sales growth is 5.6%, compared to an average of 9.6% for the rest of the 
sample; and their average employment growth rate is negative (-3.3%, compared to 
0.9% for the other groups). These low growth rates may reflect the fact that SOEs 
respond to social and political needs, as well as to economic objectives (Bai et al., 
2006). SOEs are typically larger (in terms of assets and number of employees) and 
older than other groups: they employ an average of 430.4 employees, compared to 
250.0 for the rest of the sample; their total assets are worth 771.8 (thousands of yuan) 
compared to 466.4 for the other three groups; and their average age is 30.1, compared 
to 12.3 for the rest of the sample. SOEs also display very low levels of cash flow, and 
high levels of leverage: their cash flow to assets ratio is 4.5%, compared to an average 
of 8.3% for the other groups; their cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio is 15.9% 
compared to 33.0% for the rest of the sample
16; and their total liabilities to total assets 
ratio is 63.2%, compared to 56.9% for the other groups. Finally, SOEs display a very 
low level of labor productivity (measured as the ratio of  real sales to total number of 
employees): 159.9% compared to 279.5% for the rest of the sample. 
As for foreign firms, they are large (employing 316.0 people), and very young 
(their average age being 9.9 years). Compared to the other ownership categories, they 
display the highest levels of labor productivity (315.7%), and the lowest ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets (45.3%).  
Despite being small in terms of average number of employees (232.8), private 
firms exhibit the highest average assets growth and sales growth rates, respectively 
8.5% and 10.4%. They also exhibit a high cash flow to assets ratio (8.3%). This figure 
is much higher compared to the corresponding figure reported by Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002) for US small listed firms (6.2%). It is also very similar to their assets 
growth figure (8.5%), suggesting that, in a world of binding constraints, th ese firms‟ 
growth is in line with what their internal resources might permit. 
It is interesting to note from Table 3 that the foreign, private, and collective 
firms, all exhibit a cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio in excess of 30%. This 
                                                 
16 As cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation, one could question whether these data could 
be biased due to firms‟ tendency to misreport profits. Liu and Xiao (2004) document that it is mainly 
private firms, and not SOEs, which have the highest propensity to disguise profits. Hence, the rankings 
of the cash flow to asses ratios reported in Table 3 should not change taking this under-reporting into 
account. Furthermore, considering that it is reasonable to assume that measurement error due to mis-
reporting of profits is time-invariant, in our regressions, we account for it in the firm-specific time-
invariant component of the error term of our estimating equations (see section 4.1).   12 
figure  is  very  high  compared  to  corresponding  figures  registered  for  the  US  or 
Europe. For instance, Bond et al. (2003) report cash flow to capital ratios of 13.4% for 
the UK; 17.8% for Belgium; 11.9%, for France; and 16%, for Germany. Similarly, 
Cummins et al. (2006) report a ratio of 19% for US firms. The high cash flow to 
capital ratios displayed by Chinese non-state firms suggests that these firms have the 
ability to generate high profits. This can be explained considering their high labor 
productivity, which amounts to an average of 279.5% over our sample period. This 
high  productivity  may  be,  among  other  factors,  a  consequence  of  the  country‟s 
extremely high saving rate (averaging around 40%), which has enabled it to “rapidly 
build up its capital stock and shift a massive pool of underutilized labor from the 
subsistence-agriculture  sector  into  higher-productivity  activities  that  use  capital.” 
(Mishkin, 2006, p. 205).  
  In  the  sections  that  follow,  we  estimate  firm-level  dynamic  assets  growth 
equations that incorporate cash flow, for our four categories of firms, to formally 
assess the extent to which the growth of firms in each of the categories is affected by 
the availability of internal finance. 
 
4.  Empirical specifications and estimation methodology 
 
4.1  Baseline model 
We  initially  estimate  the  following  simple  dynamic  assets  growth  model  that 
incorporates the cash flow to assets ratio
17: 
 
(Assets growth)it = a0(Assets growth)i(t-1) + a1(Cash flow/total assets)it+ error term, (1) 
 
where the subscript i identifies firms, and the subscript t, time. The error term in 
Equation (1) comprises a firm-specific time-invariant component, encompassing all 
time-invariant firm  characteristics likely to  influence  growth, as  well as  the time-
invariant  component  of  the  measurement  error  affecting  any  of  the  regression 
                                                 
17 This specification differs from that estimated by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) in two main respects. 
First, we estimate a dynamic model, while they estimate a static one. We chose a dynamic model, as 
the static model was clearly rejected by our specification tests. Second, as Carpenter and Petersen‟s 
(2002) sample is made up of listed US firm, they include Tobin‟s Q as an additional regressor. As most 
of the firms in our sample are not listed, we were unable to construct Tobin‟s Q, and therefore exclude 
it from our regression. Later, we will show that our results are robust to controlling for investment 
opportunities in various alternative ways.   13 
variables; a time-specific component accounting for possible business cycle effects; 
and  an  idiosyncratic  component.  We  control  for  the  firm-specific  time-invariant 
component of the error term by estimating our equation in first-differences, and for 
the time-specific component by including time dummies in all our specifications. We 
estimate Equation (1) separately for the four ownership groups
18. 
As discussed in Carpenter and Petersen (2002), i n the presence of  capital 
market imperfections,  one should  expect the coefficient  a1  in  Equation  (1)  to  be 
slightly greater than one for those firms more likely to face financial constraints. This 
is because for these firms, external finance is typically more expensive than internal 
finance. Thus, should cash flow increase, financially constrained firms would be able 
to increase their assets (which make up all possible uses of firms‟ cash flow) one-for-
one
19. Furthermore, as a higher cash flow also indicates a higher collateral, firms that 
benefit from a higher cash flow are also likely to find it easier to obtain loans. Thus, in 
the  presence  of  an  increase  in  cash  flow,  firms  more  likely  to  face  financing 
constraints may be able to increase their total assets  slightly more than one-for-one, 
due to this collateral effect. On the other hand,  financially healthy firms can always 
access external finance: changes in their internal finance should therefore only have a 
moderate effect or no effect at all on their growth. 
Figure 1, which is adapted from Carpenter and Petersen (2002), illustrates this 
argument. The horizontal axis measures cash flow ( CF)  and  the  change  in  assets 
(TA), and the vertical axis measures the cost of finance. S denotes the supply of 
finance. The horizontal portion of this schedule reflects a situation in which internal 
finance (CF) is used and priced at a constant shadow cost R. Once internal finance is 
exhausted, the firm must turn to debt finance. Yet, the more leveraged a firm is, the 
more incentives it will have to undertake more risky investment projects. This moral 
hazard situation implies that the cost  of  debt  finance will rise  with  the degree of 
leverage of the firm, and is reflected by the upward sloping portion of the S curve 
(Hubbard, 1998)
20.  If cash flow rises from CF to CF‟, then the horizontal portion of 
                                                 
18All  results  were  robust  to  including  cash  flow  divided  by  beginning-of-period  instead  of 
contemporaneous total assets.  
19 In theory, it is also possible for firms to use part of their cash flow to pay off debts . In this case, the 
coefficient  associated  with  cash  flow  could  drop  below  one,  even  in  the  presence  of  liquidity 
constraints. 
20  One can interpret debt finance in a broad sense, also including accounts payable. Contrary to 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002), our Figure 1 does not include an upper horizontal portion of the S curve   14 
the S curve becomes longer. Moreover, due to the increase in net worth from which 
the firm benefits as a consequence of the rise in cash flow, the upward sloping portion 
of the S curve becomes slightly flatter. If the investment opportunities schedule (IO) 
intersects the S curve in its upward sloping portion, A rises to A’. This implies that, 
in  the  presence  of  financing  constraints,  a  given  increase  in  cash  flow  may  be 
associated with a slightly more than one-for-one increase in total assets
21. This precise 
quantitative prediction allows for a sharper test of the financing constraints hypothesis 
than could be achieved simply focusing on the links between investment and cash 
flow
22. 
It should be noted that  Figure 1 is unlikely to apply to  Chinese SOEs. As 
widely documented in the literature, these firms are in fact able to receive as many 
cheap loans from the  state owned banks as they need, independent on profitability  
(Boyreau-Debray, 2003). This is a consequence of their need to respond to both social 
and political stresses, as well as to economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006).  The supply 
of funds schedule is therefore likely to be horizontal for SOEs, and we do not expect 
their asset growth to be significantly affected by their cash flow
23. A similar scenario 
is  likely  to  hold  for  collective  firms,  wh ich  being  generally  managed  by  local 
governments, may still benefit from easy credit. On the other hand, we would expect a 
rise in cash flow to generate a one-for-one (or slightly more than one-for-one) rise in 
total assets for the  private firms, which are typically discriminated against by t he 
banking sector. As for foreign firms, the link between their cash flow and growth 
would depend on whether they make use of domestic credit markets or are financed 
by their parent company. In the former case, one  could expect a one -to-one  (or 
                                                                                                                                            
relating to equity issuance. This is because our sample consists mainly of unlisted firms and equity 
markets are still poorly developed in China.  
21 This prediction relies on the assumption that the IO schedule is highly elastic compared to the supply 
of  finance.  This  is  a  reasonable  assumption  considering  that  none  of  the  firms  in  our  sample  is 
sufficiently large to be able to affect prices by growing. Note that, in the absence of a collateral effect, 
as cash flow rises from CF to CF’, the upward sloping portion of the new S curve would not become 
flatter and the rise in cash flow would be associated with a rise in total assets of similar magnitude. 
22 It has been argued that the links between investment and cash flow observed in the literature could be 
due to the latter variable proxying for investment opportunit ies, rather than to financing constraints 
(Cummins et al., 2006; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008). If this were the case, however, a slightly higher 
than one-to-one relationship between investment and cash flow would not necessarily follow. Hence, 
finding such a relationship can be seen as reliable evidence for the presence of financing constraints 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
23 Note, however, that a positive association between assets growth or, more specifically, investment 
and cash flow could still be o bserved for SOEs if managers wishing to pursue private objectives 
overinvested relative to the optimum, by using „free cash flow‟ for unprofitable investment projects 
(Jensen,  1986;  Carpenter,  1995).  In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  never  observe  such  a  positive 
association.   15 
slightly more than one-to-one) relationship, while in the latter, one would observe a 
cash flow coefficient either lower than one, or poorly determined altogether. 
Equation (1) does not take into account investment opportunities, which are 
reflected in shifts in the IO curve in Figure 1. This could induce bias in the cash flow 
coefficient, as cash flow could be accounting for the omitted investment opportunities 
(Cummins  et  al.,  2006;  Carpenter  and  Guariglia,  2008).  Typically,  investment 
opportunities are accounted for through Tobin‟s Q, which is defined as the market 
value of the  firm  over  the replacement value of its  total  assets.  Yet,  because our 
sample is  made up of unlisted firms,  we are unable to  calculate  Q. We therefore 
account for investment opportunities in two alternative ways. First, we proxy them 
with industry-level value added growth. Value added is considered an overall measure 
of efficiency within a certain disaggregated industry. It is plausible to assume that 
increased efficiency gives rise to a number of investment opportunities emerging in 
that specific industry. This measure closely follows the intuition of Whited and Wu 
(2006) who argue that industry efficiency is a good proxy to assess the degree of 
investment opportunities. Second, we include in our model time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies (in addition to the aggregate time dummies). This approach 
can be seen as an indirect way to account for investment opportunities, or more in 
general demand factors, as the dummies account for all time-varying demand shocks 
at the industry level (Brown et al., 2009; Duchin et al., 2010). If the correlation of 
cash flow with investment opportunities were an important source of bias, then the 
cash flow coefficients should decline substantially when we include industry-level 
value added growth or industry-level time dummies in our specification. 
 
4.2  Estimation methodology 
All  equations  are  estimated  in  first-differences,  to  control  for  firm-specific,  time-
invariant effects. Given the possible endogeneity of our regressors, we use a first-
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), which makes use of lagged values of the regressors as instruments.  
To check whether the first-difference GMM estimator is likely to suffer from 
finite sample bias, we compare the GMM and the Within Groups estimates of the 
coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable  in  Equation  (1).  Because  the  Within 
Groups estimate is typically downward biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981), one 
would expect a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable   16 
to lie above this estimate. As our GMM coefficient is larger than its Within Groups 
counterpart, we conclude that the first-difference GMM estimates are unlikely to be 
subject to serious finite sample bias
24. 
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we assess whether the variables in the instrument set are uncorrelated with 
the error term in the relevant equation. To this end, we use two criteria. The first is the 
Sargan test (also known as  J test), which is a test for overidentifying restrictions. 
Under the null of instrument validity, this test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-
square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of 
parameters.  
Our  second  criterion  is  based  on  the  serial  correlation  in  the  differenced 
residuals. In the presence of serial correlation of order 2 in the differenced residuals, 
the instrument set needs to be restricted to lags 3 and deeper. The latter instruments 
are valid in the absence of serial correlation of order 3 in the differenced residuals 
(Brown and Petesen, 2009;  Roodman, 2006).  We assess the presence of  n
th-order 
serial  correlation  in  the  differenced  residuals  using  the  m(n)  test,  which  is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no n
th-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals. 
We select our instruments on the basis of the following strategy. We initially 
use our regressors lagged twice and three times  as instruments. If the Sargan test 
and/or the test for second order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals fail (which 
could  happen,  for  instance,  in  the  presence  of  measurement  error),  we  omit  the 
regressors lagged twice from the instrument set (Bond, 2002).
25 Deeper lags of the 
instruments are only included if they improve the specification tests.  
                                                 
24 These estimates, which are based on the full sample, are not reported for brevity, but are available 
upon request. If the estimates obtained using the first-difference GMM estimator lie close or below the 
Within  Groups  estimates,  one  could  suspect  the  GMM  estimate  to  be  downward  biased  as  well, 
possibly due to weak instruments. In such case, the use of a GMM system estimator (which combines 
in a system the original specification expressed in first differences and in levels) would be required 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
25 The exact instruments used in each specification are reported in the Notes to the Tables.  All Tables 
report the  m1 test for first-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. Considering that our 
equations are estimated in first-differences, in most cases we find evidence of significant negative first-
order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. For those specifications in which the most recent 
instruments are dated t-2 (t-3), we report the m2 (m3) test for second- (third-) serial correlation of the 
differenced residuals. For those specifications that make use of both instruments dated t-2 and t-3, we 
report both the  m2 and the m3 tests. Note that neither the  J test nor the test for  n-th order serial 
correlation  in  the  differenced  residuals  allow  to  discriminate  between  bad  instruments  and  model 
specification. All our results were generally robust to using GMM with an “orthogonal deviations” 
transformation, instead of a first-difference transformation (Arellano and Bover, 1995). They were also   17 
 
5.  Empirical tests 
 
5.1  Main results 
Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (1). Column 1 refers to SOEs, and columns 2 
to  4,  respectively  to  foreign  owned,  private,  and  collective  firms.  The  coefficient 
associated with the lagged dependent variable is negative and precisely determined for 
all  groups  of  firms,  except  the  collective  ones. This  can  be  seen  as  evidence  for 
convergence.  Furthermore,  the  cash  flow  coefficient  is  positive  and  precisely 
determined for foreign and private firms, while it is poorly determined for SOEs and 
collective firms. It is equal to 1.09 for foreign owned firms and to 0.98 for privately 
owned firms. Considering that these two groups of firms also exhibit large cash flow 
to total assets ratios (respectively, 8.30% and 8.28%), these results suggest that their 
growth  is  restricted  by  their  profit  generating  capacity.  As  for  SOEs,  their 
insignificant cash flow coefficient reflects on the one hand, their very low level of 
cash flow to total assets (4.51%), and on the other, the fact that these firms may still 
experience soft budget constraints. State owned banks typically lend to these firms, 
independently of their profitability, preventing them to go bankrupt, as this would 
generate a significant social unrest (Bai et al., 2006; Boyreau-Debray, 2003). In terms 
of Figure 1, this suggests that SOEs indeed face a horizontal S curve. The same is 
likely  to  apply  to  collective  firms,  given  their  links  with  local  governments.  Our 
results compare favorably with Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet et al. (2010) 
who, focusing on investment, also find that SOEs are the least financially constrained, 
while private firms are the most constrained. 
Table 4 contains a row which reports in every column the p-values of an F-test 
of the null hypothesis (H0) that the cash flow coefficient is greater than or equal to 1. 
The aim of this test is to see whether there is indeed a one-to-one (or slightly larger 
than one-to-one) relationship between firms‟ assets  growth  and their cash  flow to 
assets ratio, as discussed in the previous section. The lower the p-value, the stronger the 
evidence in favor of rejection of H0. We can see that the p-values are the highest for 
privately owned and foreign owned firms, for which they are equal to 0.95 and 0.81 
                                                                                                                                            
robust to using a simple fixed effects instrumental variable (IV) estimator, the results of which are 
reported in Table A1 of Appendix 2. Yet, because the IV estimator is less efficient than the GMM 
estimator, the latter remains our preferred one.   18 
respectively. The p-value is smallest for state-owned firms (0.09). The p-value for 
collective firms falls in between (0.27). Hence, the p-values confirm that the cash 
flow coefficient is much more likely to be greater than or equal to 1 for privately and 
foreign owned firms, than for collective firms and SOEs.  
The Sargan and m2/m3 tests generally do not highlight significant problems 
with the validity of the instruments and/or the specification of the model. In column 3, 
where the most recent instruments are lagged three times, the m3 test shows some 
mild  evidence  of  third  order  serial  correlation  of  the  residuals.  Yet,  because  the 
Sargan test is satisfactory, we do not think this to be a serious issue. 
Table 5 presents estimates of variants of Equation (1), which also control for 
investment opportunities. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 contain the estimates of the Equation 
where  demand  factors  are  accounted  for  with  industry-level  value  added  growth, 
while columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 contain the estimates of the Equation which includes 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies.  
From the odd columns, we can see that industry-level value added growth 
always has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant for all firms except 
the collective ones. As for the coefficient on cash flow, we can see, both from the 
even and the odd columns, that it remains poorly determined for SOEs and collective 
firms, while for the other groups of firms, it is statistically significant and close to 
one. The p-values associated with the testing of the hypothesis that the cash flow 
coefficient is greater than or equal to 1 are always the highest for private and foreign 
owned firms, and the lowest for SOEs. Furthermore, when investment opportunities 
are accounted for with value added growth, the cash flow coefficients for foreign 
owned and private firms become slightly lower than those reported in Table 4. Yet, 
when we include time dummies interacted with industry dummies, they remain very 
similar to those in Table 4, suggesting that the correlation between cash flow and 
investment  opportunities  is  unlikely  to  be  a  significant  source  of  bias.  In  all 
subsequent regressions, we will take into account investment opportunities including 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies. 
In  columns  5  and  7,  the  Sargan  test  indicates  some  problems  with  the 
specification of the model and/or the validity of the instruments. The m2/m3 test in 
columns  5  and  6  indicate  that  the  null  that  the  differenced  residuals  are  not 
autocorrelated of order two/three can only be accepted at the 1% level. Yet, because   19 
column 5 is the only case in which both tests highlight problems, we conclude that our 
instruments and specification are generally acceptable. 
These  results  confirm  our  initial  conjecture  that  Chinese  firms  are  very 
heterogeneous  in  terms  of  their  degree  of  dependence  on  internal  finance. 
Specifically, SOEs and collective firms are the least dependent, while private and 
foreign owned firms are the most dependent. The dependence of foreign owned firms 
on cash flow can be seen as evidence that these firms cannot only finance themselves 
through their parent company, but also need to rely on the profits that they generate 
internally,  as  well  as  on  local  financial  markets.  Their  reliance  on  local  financial 
markets can be inferred from their cash flow coefficient, which is larger than one in 
column 4, suggesting the presence of a colateral effect, whereby higher cash flow is 
associated with the possibility of obtaining more leverage. 
  It  is  likely  that  because  private  firms  have  very  good  investment 
opportunities
26, and do not always have access to reasonably priced external finance, 
the higher and higher cash flows that they have been generating, have translated 
themselves into higher and higher growth rates. Whether there will be a limit to such 
growth  will  hence  depend  on  whether  these  firms‟  competitive  advantage  will  be 
eroded. If this happened, due for instance, to increasing raw materials or labor costs, 
to a realignment of the exchange rate, and/or to increased competition, then private 
firms‟ ability to generate profits may be reduced, which could seriously limit their 
growth.    
 
5.2  Robustness tests  
 
5.2.1  Excluding cash and equivalents from total assets 
Firms‟ total assets include the stock of cash and equivalents. It is possible that firms 
might  absorb  some  of  the  short-run  fluctuations  in  cash  flow  with  cash  and 
equivalents, leading to  a positive relationship between changes in assets and cash 
flow, even in the absence of financing constraints (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). To 
rule out this effect, we remove the “other current assets category” from our definition 
of growth and re-estimate our Equation (1) using this alternative definition of assets 
                                                 
26 Evidence that Chinese firms face particularly good investment opportunities can be inferred from the 
fact  that  China  is  now  one  of  the  few  low  or  low-middle  income  countries  whose  level  of  R&D 
intensity has risen beyond 1% (Hu and Jefferson, 2008).    20 
growth
27.  We  account  for  investment  opportunities  by  including  time  dummies 
interacted  with  in dustry  dummies.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  6.  The 
coefficient on cash flow declines substantially for all firms.  This is not surprising as 
the dependent variable no longer captures all potential uses of  internal finance. The 
fact that the coefficient is still precisely determined  only  for foreign  owned and 
private firms confirms that these firms face a certain degree of financial constraints
28.  
 
5.2.2  Alternative definition of ownership categories 
Table 7 presents results where firm ownership categories are defined on the basis of a 
100% of paid-in-capital rule. According to this rule, a firm is defined as privately 
owned if private agents own 100% of its capital in each of the eight years making up 
our sample. Foreign owned, state owned, and collectively owned firms are defined in 
a similar way. These new categories obviously contain fewer observations than the 
previous ones, as they  exclude firms that changed their ownership status over the 
period considered. Time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included in 
all specifications to control for investment opportunities. The results are once again 
similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5: growth at SOEs and collective firms is not 
affected by internal finance, while growth at foreign owned and private firms is most 
affected.  
 
5.2.3  Estimating a fixed investment regression 
Many  empirical  studies  in  the  financing  constraints  literature  have  estimated 
equations of fixed investment as a function of cash flow. To provide a comparison 
with this literature, we substitute the fixed investment to assets ratio for the growth of 
assets and re-estimate Equation (1). The results are presented in Table 8. Like in our 
assets growth regressions, only the foreign owned and private firms exhibit positive 
and precisely determined investment-cash flow sensitivities. The cash flow coefficient 
for foreign owned firms is 0.36, and that for private firms is 0.37. The size of these 
                                                 
27 Our data do not allow us to separately identify cash and equivalents. These are included in the “other 
current  assets  category”,  which  also  includes  prepaid  expenses  and  advances,  other  current  assets, 
deferred charges, and short term investments. 
28 Our results were also robust to replacing assets growth with sales growth or employment growth. 
However, when using these alternative measures of growth, one would not expect a one -to-one 
relationship between changes in cash flow   and growth. Furthermore, our results were robust to 
including in our regressions other financial variables used in the financing constraints literature, such as 
the coverage ratio or the total liabilities to total assets ratio.   21 
coefficients confirms that to ensure a one-to-one relationship between the dependent 
variable and cash flow, the former must contain all uses of internal finance, not just 
fixed investment. Our findings, which are in line with Héricourt and Poncet (2009), 




5.3  Exploring private firms’ heterogeneity 
 
5.3.1  Estimating Equation (1) for different subsamples of private firms 
As private firms represent our largest group (64% of our sample), which is likely to be 
characterized  by  considerable  heterogeneity,  we  next  investigate  whether  the 
sensitivities of assets growth to cash flow vary for different types of private firms. To 
this  end,  we  estimate  Equation  (1)  for  the  following  sub-groups  of  firms:  firms 
operating inside and outside the coastal region; firms with foreign participation above 
and below 10%; firms with state participation above and below 10%; and firms with 
and without affiliation with the central and/or provincial governments. These sample 
splits can be motivated as follows.  
With reference to location, firms operating in central and western areas may 
benefit from financial incentives, thanks to policies aimed at developing those regions 
(Goodman, 2004). In contrast, firms operating in coastal regions are likely to suffer 
from significant financing constraints, due to high competition for a limited pool of 
funds.  
As for ownership, those private firms with some degree of foreign capital may 
face less financing constraints than those without: private firms may in fact choose to 
team up with foreign firms, in order to obtain equity finance from them, and bypass in 
this way, the financing constraints they face at home (Huang, 2003). If this were the 
case, this  argument  could also  explain the empirical  findings  in  Greenaway et  al. 
(2009),  according  to  which  in  China,  joint  ventures  typically  perform  better  than 
purely domestic firms. Similarly, by teaming up with state firms, private firms could 
benefit from the soft budget constraints that typically characterize the former.  
                                                 
29 Our findings contradict those in Chow and Fung (1998) and Poncet et al. (2010), who find that the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow is lowest for foreign owned firms. This is probably due to the fact 
that our study is not directly comparable to theirs as the former only focus on a very small sample of 
firms operating in Shanghai, over the period 1989-92, while the latter focuses on 7,316 observations for 
foreign firms, compared to our 46,561. Our  much larger dataset is likely to include those smaller 
foreign firms, which are more likely to face credit constraints.   22 
Coming to political connections (Guanxi), these could be beneficial for private 
firms, giving them “better access to key resources that are controlled by the Party and 
the government, such as business operation licenses, bank loans, land, and eligibility 
for  favorable  but  discretionary  government  policies  such  as  tax  benefits  and  the 
waiver of “extralegal” fees” (Li et al., 2008, p. 288).  
The estimates of Equation (1) for these subsamples of firms are reported in 
columns 1 to 8 of Table 9. For each of the four groupings, an F test is performed to 
test for the equality of the cash flow coefficient across groups. The p-values of this 
test are reported in the Table.  
We can see that only firms operating in the coastal region (column 2), firms 
with foreign and state ownership lower than 10% (columns 3 and 5), and firms with 
no affiliation with the central or provincial governments (column 7) exhibit positive 
and statistically significant assets growth to cash flow sensitivities. This confirms that 
there is some heterogeneity within the private firm category, i.e. that not all private 
firms suffer from the same degree of financing constraints. Yet, the F test for the 
difference of cash flow coefficients across sub-samples suggests that the coefficients 
across firms with different degrees of state participation, and firms with and without 
central and/or provincial political affiliation are not statistically different from each 
other at the 10% level. Hence, we can conclude that it is mainly those private firms 
that differ in terms of their location and their degree of foreign ownership, which also 
differ in the degree of financing constraints that they face. 
  Focusing on the p-values associated with the F test for the hypothesis that the 
cash flow coefficient is greater than or equal to 1, we can see that firms operating in 
coastal areas are much more likely to have a cash flow coefficient greater than or 
equal  to  1  (p-value=  0.8)  than  firms  operating  in  central  or  western  areas  (p-
value=0.0). The same applies to firms with no foreign ownership (p-value = 0.55) 
relative to their counterparts with some foreign ownership (p-value = 0.02).   
In summary, our results so far show that there exists some heterogeneity in the 
degree  of  financing  constraints  faced  by  Chinese  private  firms,  whereby  firms 
operating in the coastal region, and characterized by negligible foreign participation 
show the highest sensitivities of assets growth to cash flow
30. In order to reduce the 
                                                 
30 One could ask why, considering that foreign ownership  alleviates the degree of financing constraints 
faced  by  private  firms,  majority  owned  foreign  firms  appear  to  suffer  from  significant  financing 
constraints  (see,  for  instance,  columns  3  and  4  of  Table  5).  It  could  be  that  increased  foreign   23 
entity of financing constraints that they face, private firms could therefore locate in 
central or western regions, and/or team up with foreign firms. These are important 
findings  as  they  can  be  used  by  firm  managers  to  adopt  strategies  aimed  at 
overcoming the financing constraints that they face.  
To shed further light on the heterogeneity of private firms in terms of the 
degree of financing constraints that they face, we move beyond the partitioning of our 
firms into sub-samples ex-ante more and less likely to face financing constraints and 
use  a  methodology  recently  proposed  by  Hovakimian  and  Hovakimian  (2009)  to 
construct a firm-level measure of the degree of financing constraints faced by each 
firm.  This  measure  is  based  on  the  sensitivity  of  assets  growth  to  cash  flow 
characterizing each firm (CFSi), and is calculated as follows: 
 
CFSi =    
          
          
  
            
          
  
 
   
                    
    -
 
                  
 
     (2) 
                       
where n is the number of annual observations for firm i, and t indicates time. In sum, 
our firm-level cash flow sensitivities are given by the difference between the cash 
flow weighted time-series average assets growth of a firm and its simple arithmetic 
time-series average assets growth
31. This difference will be higher for firms that tend 
to display a higher assets growth in years with relatively high cash flow and a lower 
assets growth in years with low cash flow, i.e. for firms more likely to face financing 
constraints (Hovakimian and Hovakimian, 2009)
32.  
                                                                                                                                            
participation is beneficial to the financial health of a joint-venture only up to a certain point. Local 
banks may in fact be reluctant to lend money to majority owned foreign  firms. As documented in 
World Bank (2006), fully foreign owned firms operating in China have limited access to domestic 
direct  finance,  and  have  to  finance  much  of  their  investment  from  abroad.  Along  similar  lines, 
Greenaway et al. (2009) find that corporate performance increases as foreign participation rises up to 
the range 47% to 64%, depending on the measure of performance used, and declines thereafter. 
31  It is noteworthy that the sensitivities constructed by Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) are 
sensitivities  of  investment  to  cash  flow,  not  sensitivities  of  assets  growth  to  cash  flow.  As  in 
Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009), to avoid negative and extreme weight values, negative cash flows 
in Equation (2) are set equal to zero. 
32 It should be noted that th ese firm-level cash flow sensitivities cannot be interpreted as the rise in 
assets growth that follows a rise in cash flow, controlling for other factors. Hence, we do not expect 
them to be greater than or equal to 1 for firms more likely to be financially constrained. Yet, we expect 
these sensitivities to be higher for firms that exhibit higher (lower) assets growth in years characterized 
by high (low) cash flow. Hence, high sensitivities can be seen as an indicator of binding financing 
constraints. Hovakimian (2009) proposes an alternative way of calculating cash flow sensitivities. In 
Appendix 3, we show that all results reported in this sub -section are robust to using this alternative 
methodology.   24 
  We next identify firms with sensitivities above and below the third quartile of 
the  distribution  of  the  sensitivities  of  all  firms  in  our  sample,  and  run  our  assets 
growth equations on these two sub-samples. The results are reported in columns 9 and 
10 of Table 9. We can see that the coefficient associated with cash flow is poorly 
determined  for  observations  with  sensitivities  below  the  third  quartile  of  the 
distribution (column 9), which are allegedly the least constrained. In contrast, the 
same coefficient is positive, strongly significant, and greater than 1 for observations 
with  sensitivities  above  the  third  quartile,  which  are  more  likely  to  face  binding 
financing  constraints  (column  10).  The  difference  between  the  two  coefficients  is 
statistically significant. The F-test for the hypothesis that the cash flow coefficient is 
greater than or equal to 1 suggests that firms with high CFS are much more likely to 
display  a  coefficient  greater  than  or  equal  to  unity  (p-value  =  0.99)  than  their 
counterparts with low CFS (p-value = 0.00). These findings suggest that our firm-
level cash flow sensitivities correctly identify firms that are more and less likely to 
face  financing  constraints,  and  further  confirm  that  private  firms  are  indeed 
heterogeneous in the degree of financing constraints that they face. 
 
5.3.2  Do  the  simultaneous  pervasive  credit  constraints  and  high  growth  that 
characterize private firms induce significant efficiency losses? 
Despite the heterogeneity that characterizes them, we have found that, as a group, 
private firms are severely financially constrained. Yet, they exhibit high assets growth 
(8.46% according to Table 3). Considering that their cash flow to assets ratio is also 
very high and of similar magnitude as their assets growth rate (8.3% according to 
Table 3), the question arises of whether the high growth characterizing these firms 
may be accompanied by  significant  efficiency  losses.  In particular, one could  ask 
whether  financially  constrained  private  firms  tend  to  accumulate  high  levels  of 
internal finance in order to achieve present  growth, by reducing expenditures that 
could  sustain  growth  in  the  future,  such  as  expenditure  on  personnel  wages  and 
training
33. If this were the case, the high growth rates achieved by these firms today, 
would  inevitably  be  associated  with  lower  growth  rates  tomorrow,  and  would 
therefore not be sustainable.  A quick glance at the figures suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case. Although wages per employee are on average lower at private 
                                                 
33 We thank an anonymous Referee for suggesting this exercise.   25 
firms (13.15%) compared to the rest of the sample (16.58%), wage growth, training 
expenses,  and  training  expenses  growth  are  higher
34.  The  average  figures  are 
respectively 8.58%,  0.09% and 8.73%  for private firms, and 7.89%,  0.07%, and 
4.28% for the rest of the sample. Yet, these figures are only indicative, as they do not 
account for the heterogeneity of private firms. 
  To explore this issue further, i n Panel A of  Table 10, we present mean and 
median values of a number of variables for  firms with  high (column 1) and  low 
(column  2)  cash  flow  sensitivities .  These  variables  include  the  following  three 
categories: assets growth and cash flow , which make up category 1 ;  wages per 
employee,  training  exp enses,  and  their  growth ,  which  make  category  2;  labor 
productivity,  total  factor  productivity  (TFP,  calculated  using  the  Levinsohn  and 
Petrin, 2003, method), and their growth, which form category 3. Lower values of the 
variables in category 2 for high CFS firms could be seen as an indication that credit 
constraints are associated with efficiency losses. Yet, we can see that firms with high 
and low CFS display similar levels of all four variables. As can be seen from the p-
values of the F-test for the equality of means reported in column 3, the differences in 
the means of these four variables across the two groups are in fact never statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Credit constraints (measured in terms of assets growth 
sensitivities  to  cash  flow) do  not  therefore  seem  to  be associated with  significant 
efficiency  losses.  Yet,  observations  characterized  by  high  cash  flow  sensitivities 
exhibit lower assets growth, cash flow, labor productivity, TFP and labor productivity 
growth  than  their  counterparts  with  low  sensitivities.  All  these  differences  are 
statistically  significant  and  suggest  credit  market  imperfections  do  represent  a 
significant impediment to firm behavior.  
  Although there is no evidence that compared to their counterparts with low 
CFS, private firms with high CFS suffer from efficiency losses, these losses could be 
limited to those financially constrained firms characterized by high growth. The latter 
could in fact realize high growth rates by accumulating internal funds, at the expense 
of wage increases and training of personnel, thus reducing the potential for future 
growth. If this were the case, it could be seen as evidence of efficiency losses induced 
by  simultaneous  pervasive  credit  constraints  and  high  growth.  To  investigate  this 
                                                 
34 By wages, we mean wages per employee, i.e. the ratio between the firm‟s total wage bill and its total 
number of employees. Education expenses are defined as the total expenditure incurred by the firm on 
the training of personnel. These expenditures are normalized by total assets.   26 
hypothesis, in Panel B of Table 10, we report means and medians of our variables for 
high growth firms characterized by high (column 1) and low CFS (column 3)
35.  
Comparing column 1 of Panel B of  Table 10 with column 2 of Panel A of the 
same Table, we can see that those firms with high CFS and high assets growth display 
a much higher cash flow to tangible assets ratio (40.08%) than their counterparts with 
low cash flow (32.48%). This suggests that financially constrained firms may be using 
internally generated funds to finance their growth. But does this accumulation of high 
cash flow happen at the expense of expenditures that could sustain growth in the 
future? We attempt to answer this question by comparing the mean values of wages 
per  employee,  training  expenses,  and  their  growth  at  firms  characterized  by  high 
growth and high CFS, on the one hand; and firms characterized by low CFS, on the 
other. Comparison of the figures in column 1 of Panel B and column 2 of Panel A of 
Table 10 suggests that the former have an average level (14.6%) and growth rate 
(11.5%)  of  wages  per  employee,  which  are  much  higher,  compared  to  the 
corresponding  figures  for  the  latter  (13.1%  and  8.7%).  They  also  have  a  higher 
training expenses growth rate (16.3%, which compares with 9.0% for firms with low 
CFS).  These  differences  are  all  statistically  significant.  In  sum,  although  there  is 
evidence that accumulating high cash flows plays an important role in explaining how 
financially constrained firms manage to achieve high growth, there is no evidence 
whatsoever  that  financially  constrained  firms  characterized  by  high  growth 
accumulate high cash flows by reducing expenditures that could in the future sustain 
growth.  
Finally,  Table  10  shows  that  compared  to  firms  with  low  CFS,  firms 
simultaneously characterized by high CFS and high growth display very high labor 
productivity and TFP, as well as very high growth rates of both types of productivity 
measures. For firms with high CFS and high growth, the two figures are respectively 
340.4% and 13.50% for labor productivity, and 442.3% and 15.9% for TFP (column 
1, Table 10, Panel B), which compare with values of 275.5% and 9.7%, and 351.9% 
and  8.8%,  for  firms  with  low  CFS  (column  2,  Table  10,  Panel  A).  All  these 
differences are statistically significant. These statistics suggest that these firms‟ high 
productivity is more likely to explain their ability to generate high cash flows, than the 
reduction of expenses on wages and personnel training. Chinese private firms‟ high 
                                                 
35 We define high growth firms as firms whose average assets growth over the sample period falls in 
the top quartile of the distribution of the average assets growth of all firms in the sample.   27 
productivity levels, coupled with an environment characterized by relatively low labor 
and  raw  material  costs,  an  undervalued  exchange  rate,  and  relatively  lax 
environmental and labor standards may therefore have played an important role in 
explaining  how  financially  constrained  firms  have  managed  to  invest  and  grow 
despite the financing constraints that they face. 
Comparing the means in columns 1 and 3 of Panel B of Table 10, we see that with 
the exception of assets growth, the cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio, the wage to 
employee ratio, and TFP, none of the differences in the means of the other variables 
across high growth firms with high and low CFS are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In particular, although high growth firms with high CFS grow at a lower rate, 
accumulate more cash flow, and pay higher wages than their counterparts with low 
sensitivities, the two groups of firms are quite similar with respect to wage growth, 
training expenses and training expenses growth. Yet, they display higher TFP, which 
could, once again, explain their higher cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio.   
In  conclusion,  the  statistics  in  Table  10  suggest  that  there  is  no  evidence  of 
significant  efficiency  losses  induced  by  simultaneous  pervasive  credit  constraints 
(proxied by high cash flow sensitivities) and high growth. We have shown that these 
characteristics are generally accompanied by higher productivity. It is therefore likely 
that  Chinese  firms  manage  to  invest  and  grow  despite  the  significant  financial 
constraints that they face, because their high productivity enables them to generate 
large amounts of internal funds, which they then use to invest and grow. Yet, had 
external finance been available for them, these firms would have been able to grow at 
even higher rates. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
What is the final verdict on the effect of internal finance on the growth of Chinese 
firms? We have found that the growth of SOEs and collective firms is not affected by 
the availability of cash flow, while that of private and foreign firms is most affected. 
These results are robust to accounting for investment opportunities in different ways, 
to considering assets growth net of cash, and to using different criteria to define our 
ownership categories. They suggest that SOEs are not subject to financing constraints, 
probably  because  of  the  important  role  they  play  in  absorbing  surplus  labor  and 
helping to maintain social stability, which guarantees them unlimited loans from the 
state  banks.  In  contrast,  private  firms  are  the  most  financially  constrained,  being   28 
typically  discriminated  against  by  the  banking  sector.  We  have  also  found  some 
degree of heterogeneity across private firms: it is those private firms that operate in 
the coastal regions and have negligible foreign ownership that are most affected by 
the financing constraints. These are important findings as they can be used by firm 
managers to adopt strategies aimed at overcoming the financing constraints that they 
face. Furthermore, based on firm-level cash flow sensitivities, we have found that 
there  is  no  evidence  of  significant  efficiency  losses  induced  by  the  simultaneous 
pervasive credit constraints and high growth that characterize private firms. 
Considering that over the period examined, private firms have achieved very 
high assets growth rates, in spite of being discriminated against by the banking sector, 
we can conclude that this has been made possible by the high cash flows that these 
highly productive firms have been able to accumulate. High growth rates are hence 
compatible  with  binding  financial  constraints  as  long  as  there  are  high  levels  of 
internal finance. Well developed external capital markets may therefore not always be 
needed for faster growth.  
Our paper complements Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2009), who 
found that neither informal financing, nor trade credit played an important role in 
explaining the Chinese growth miracle, by suggesting that firms‟ ability to generate 
cash flow may have been an important factor instead. As private firms represent 64% 
of the firms in our sample, their ability to generate internal finance may therefore 
represent the solution to the puzzle of why, despite a malfunctioning financial system, 
the Chinese economy has grown at stellar rates in recent years. 
Yet, if the competitive advantage of Chinese private firms were to be eroded, 
due  for  instance  to  rising  raw  materials  and  labor  costs,  to  a  realignment  in  the 
exchange  rate,  or  to  increasing  competition,  then  these  firms‟  ability  to  generate 
internal  funds  could  be  limited.  This  could  cause  a  significant  reduction  in  their 
growth,  and  hence  in  the  country‟s  growth.  Thus,  to  make  sure  that  the  Chinese 
economy  continues  to  thrive,  measures  will  have  to  be  taken  ensuring  a  more 
widespread access to institutional finance. 
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Appendix 1: Data 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
 










5  135,195  27.09  27.09 
6  123,138  24.68  51.77 
7  122,948  24.64  76.41 
8  117,720  23.59  100.00 













2000  39,781  7.97  7.97 
2001  53,088  10.64  18.61 
2002  62,460  12.52  31.13 
2003  72,296  14.49  45.62 













Total  499,001  100.00   
 
Definitions of the variables used 
Total assets: sum of the firm‟s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current assets 
include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
Other current assets: sum of cash and equivalents, prepaid expenses and advances, 
other current assets, deferred charges, and short term investments. 
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
Fixed  investment:  It  is  constructed  as  the  difference  between  the  book  value  of 
tangible fixed assets (which include land and building; fixtures and fittings; and plant 
and vehicles) of end of year t and end of year t-1 adding depreciation of year t. 
Total liabilities: sum of current liabilities and non-current liabilities, where current 
liabilities include bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities; and non-
current liabilities include long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. 
Coverage ratio: ratio of operating profits to interest payments. 
Sales: firm‟s total sales (including domestic and overseas sales). 
Employees: total number of people employed by the firm.   35 
Wage per employee: ratio of total real wage bill to number of employees. 
Training expenditures: total expenditure incurred for the training of personnel. 
Labor productivity: ratio of total real sales to number of employees 
TFP:  total  factor  productivity  calculated  using  the  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003) 
method, applied separately to different industrial groups. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of current liabilities plus non-current liabilities to total assets, where 
current liabilities include bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities. 
Exprat: ratio of exports to total sales. 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices 
taken from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Chinese provincial units 
 
China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units, which fall into three 
categories: 22 provinces or sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and Guangxi); and 4 municipal cities or  zhixiashi, under 
direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, 
Chongqing). The distribution of these provincial units across regions is as follows 
(Qin and Song, 2009): 
 











Central region  
Shanxi  
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Appendix 2: Using an IV fixed effects estimator 
 
In Table A1, we report the estimates of our assets growth equation estimated using an 
IV  fixed  effects  model.  Contrary  to  GMM,  this  approach  does  not  involve  first-
differencing the data. We instrument cash flow and lagged assets growth using two or 
three  lags  of  these  same  variables
36.  Instrument  adequacy  is  assessed  using  the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic, which is the robust analog of the F-statistic form 
of the Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) as a global 
test for the presence of weak instruments. In three out of four cases, our F-statistics 
are above 10, verifying the Staiger-Stock (1997) “rule of thumb” (also see Baum et al, 
2007). This suggests that our instruments do not suffer from a weakness problem. 
Although these estimates are consistent with our main results obtained with GMM, 
the  IV  fixed  effects  estimator  is  typically  less  efficient  than  the  GMM  estimator, 
which remains our preferred estimator. 
 
Appendix  3:  Measuring  firm-specific  assets  growth  to  cash  flow  sensitivities 
using the methodology outlined in Hovakimian (2009) 
 
In this Appendix, we verify the robustness of the results reported in Section 5.3 to 
using  an  alternative  way  to  calculate  firm-specific  assets  growth  to  cash  flow 
sensitivities.  In  particular,  we  use  the  two-step  methodology  developed  in 
Hovakimian (2009). Considering that cash flow is not the only determinant of the 
firm‟s assets  growth, the first  step of this  methodology  consists in  estimating the 
following regression, which excludes cash flow: 
 
(Assets growth)it = a0(Assets growth)i(t-1) + a1Leverageit+ a2Collateralit+ 
+a3(Employees)it + a4(Labor productivity)it+ a5Expratit+ vi+ vt+ eit         (A1) 
 
Leverage is defined as the firms‟ ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Collateral, as 
the ratio of tangible assets to total assets; and Exprat, as the ratio of exports to total 
sales. Our choice of regressors in Equation (A1) is aimed at mirroring the regressors 
                                                 
36 The number of observations in Table A1 is smaller than that in Tables 3 and 4 because the fixed-
effects IV estimator automatically drops observations for which the requested instruments are missing. 
Results similar to those in Table A1 were obtained when the missing instruments were set to 0.   37 
usually included in cross-country growth models
37. vi represents a firm-specific effect; 
vt, a time specific effect; and eit, an idiosyncratic error term.  The latter is used in the 
second-step to calculate a measure of the firm‟s assets growth to cash flow sensitivity. 
In particular, if the firm‟s assets growth is not influenced by its cash flow, then the 
average  eit  in  periods  characterized  by  high  cash  flow  should  not  be significantly 
different from the average eit in periods with low cash flow. Hence, the average eit 
weighted  by  the  firm‟s  cash  flows  should  not  be  significantly  different  from  the 
simple  average  eit
38.  Yet,  if  the  firm‟s  assets  growth  is  positively  (negatively) 
correlated with its cash flows, then the average eit weighted by cash flows should be 
higher  (lower)  than  the  simple  average  eit.  Following  this  line  of  reasoning,  the 
following alternative measure of the firm‟s sensitivity of assets growth to cash flow 
(CFSi
alt) can be derived, where  t indexes  time and n, the number of observations 
available for firm i: 
 
CFSi
alt =    
          
          
  
            
          
  
 
   
        
    -
 
      
 
                                        (A2) 
 
CFS
alt will be higher for firms that exhibit higher (lower) assets growth in periods of 
high (low) cash flow, controlling for other factors. Like CFS, it can be considered as a 
firm-specific indicator of the degree of financing constraints faced by each firm in our 
sample. 
To assess whether CFS
alt is a valid measure of the degree of financing constraints 
faced by firms, Table A2 reports the estimates of Equation (1) for firms with high and 
low CFS
alt. As in columns 9 and 10 of Table 9, a firm is classified among the high 
(low) CFS
alt group if its CFS
alt falls in the top quartile (bottom three quartiles) of the 
CFS
alt of all the firms in the sample. We can see that the cash flow coefficient is only 
statistically significant (and equal to 2.68) for the high CFS
alt firms. This confirms 
that, like CFS, CFS
alt is a valid measure of the degree of financing constraints faced 
by firms
39. 
Table A3 reports mean and medians of the same variables reported in  Table 10, 
for all firms characterized by high and low CFS
alt on the one hand (Panel A), and for 
                                                 
37 Our results were robust to using different regressors in Equation (A1). 
38 As for CFS, the minimum weight is set to 0 in order to obtain legitimate weighted averages. 
39 Like in Section 3.5.1, these findings were robust to using a 50% cut-off point. 
   38 
high growth firms characterized by high and low CFS
alt, on the other (Panel B). Once 
again, it can be seen that while firms with low CFS
alt typically exhibit higher growth, 
higher cash flow, and higher labor productivity than their high CFS
alt counterparts, 
they do not display statistically significantly different values of wages per employee, 
training expenses over assets, and their growth.  
Focusing on those firms with high assets growth and high CFS
alt, we can see that 
they typically perform better than firms with low CFS
alt, not only in terms of growth 
and productivity, but also in terms of wages per employee and its growth, and of the 
growth in training expenses. In summary, the results reported in Section 5.3.2 and in 
this Appendix suggest that whatever the measure of firm-level assets growth to cash 
flow  sensitivities  that  we  use,  it  appears  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  significant 
efficiency losses induced by the simultaneous pervasive credit constraints (proxied by 
high cash flow sensitivities) and high growth that characterize Chinese private firms. 
     39 








Note: CF= cash flow; TA = change in total assets; R= constant shadow cost of internal finance; IO = 
investment opportunities schedule; S = supply of finance schedule. 
Source: Adapted from Carpenter and Petersen (2002). 
IO 
R 
Cost of funds  
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CF  TA  TA’ 
 
CF’ 
CF, TA   40 



































2001  10.03  18.69  54.98  16.61 
2002  8.62  17.93  59.70  14.04 
2003  7.20  17.60  64.32  11.13 
2004  6.21  17.97  66.36  9.77 
2005  5.48  18.20  68.19  8.40 
2006  4.75  18.32  69.49  7.69 






















































Intangibles  1.71  1.91  2.37  1.16 
Other fixed assets  5.06  3.48  4.87  4.24 
Accounts receivable  13.93  19.56  20.41  21.71 
Inventories  18.83  21.95  19.01  19.55 
Other current assets 
 
20.83  20.08  20.33  21.48 
 
Note: All numbers in this Table are percentages.   41 






































































































































































16,719  46,601  158,981  23,691 
 
Notes: Assets and sales are expressed in thousands of yuan. All other variables except age and number 
of employees are expressed in percentage terms. All variables were deflated using provincial ex-factory 
producer price indices. See Appendix 1 for complete definitions of all variables.   42 









































(Cash flow / 









         
         
J (p-value)  0.10  0.21  0.04  0.02 
m1  -1.72  -44.32  -7.36  -2.60 
m2    0.75     
m3  -0.87  -0.06  2.34  -1.53 
         
p-value of F-test of  
H0: cash flow coeff≥1 













Notes:  All  specifications  were  estimated  using  a  GMM  first-difference  specification.  The  figures  reported  in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and 
test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-3), 
(Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). Instruments in column 2 also include (Assets growth)i(t-2) and (Cash flow / total 
assets)i(t-2).  Time  dummies  were  always  included  in  the  instrument  set.  The  J  statistic  is  a  test  of  the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to 
Table  3.  *  indicates  significance  at  the  10%  level.  **  indicates  significance  at  the  5%  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at the 1% level.   43 
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  0.21** 
(0.09) 
  0.30*** 
(0.06) 
  0.001 
(0.14) 
 




No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
                 
J (p-value)  0.34  0.13  0.04  0.23  0.004  0.04  0.00  0.06 
m1  -1.81  -1.85  -44.49  -44.23  -8.17  -7.10  -2.90  -2.45 
m2      0.79  0.65         
m3  -0.95  -1.11  -0.07  -0.04  2.25  2.38  -1.53  -1.40 
                 
p-value of F- 
test of  
H0: cash flow 
coeff≥1 
 
0.11  0.06  0.69  0.81  0.26  0.50  0.13  0.35 
Observations 
 
16,700  16,719  46,595  46,601  158,952  158,981  23,681  23,691 
 
Notes:  All  specifications  were  estimated  using  a  GMM  first-difference  specification.  The  figures  reported  in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies were included in all specifications. In columns 2, 4, 6, 
and 8, time dummies interacted with industry dummies were also included. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-3), (Cash flow / total 
assets)i(t-3). Instruments in column 3 and 4 also include (Assets growth)i(t-2) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-2). In 
columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, (Industry level value added growth)j(t-3) are also included in the instrument set (the subscript 
j identifies industries); column 3 also includes (Industry level value added growth)j(t-2). Time dummies were always 
included in the instrument set. In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, time dummies interacted with industry dummies were also 
included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation  in  the  first-differenced  residuals,  asymptotically  distributed  as  N(0,1)  under  the  null  of  no  serial 
correlation.  m3  is  a  test  for  third-order  serial  correlation  in  the  first-differenced  residuals,  asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at 
the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   44 
Table 6: Assets growth model augmented with industry-specific time dummies: 









































(Cash flow / 










         
J (p-value)  0.92  0.64  0.43  0.04 
m1  -2.94  -6.51  -11.01  -5.43 
m3  -0.29  1.47  1.79  1.54 
         
         
Observations 
 
14,244  41,953  146,872  20,680 
 
Notes:  All  specifications  were  estimated  using  a  GMM  first-difference  specification.  The  figures  reported  in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were  included  in  all  specifications.  Standard  errors  and  test  statistics  are  asymptotically  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-3), (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). In column 4, 
the instrument set also includes: (Assets growth)i(t-4) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-4). Time dummies and time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at 
the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   45 
Table 7: Assets growth model augmented with industry-specific time dummies: 










































(Cash flow / 










         
J (p-value)  0.54  0.04  0.01  0.05 
m1  -1.88  -4.56  -6.48  -2.22 
m3  0.22  0.86  1.54  -0.60 
         
p-value of F-test of  
H0: cash flow coeff≥1 
0.11  0.45  0.34  0.21 
         
Observations 
 
7,435  26,267  91,570  7,338 
 
Notes:  All  specifications  were  estimated  using  a  GMM  first-difference  specification.  The  figures  reported  in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were  included  in  all  specifications.  Standard  errors  and  test  statistics  are  asymptotically  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-3), (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). In columns 1 
to 3, the instrument set also includes: (Assets growth)i(t-4) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-4). Time dummies and 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test 
of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for 
first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of 
no serial correlation. m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at 
the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   46 
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J (p-value)  0.85  0.08  0.86  0.17 
m1  -20.01  -0.14  -1.10  -27.81 
m2  1.34      1.46 
m3  -0.66  0.48  1.15  -1.20 
         
Observations 
 
16,688  46,561  158,860  23,658 
 
 
Notes:  All  specifications  were  estimated  using  a  GMM  first-difference  specification.  The  figures  reported  in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were  included  in  all  specifications.  Standard  errors  and  test  statistics  are  asymptotically  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in columns 2 and 3 are (Fixed investment/total assets)i(t-3) and (Cash flow / total 
assets)i(t-3). Instruments in columns 1 and 4 are (Fixed investment/total assets)i(t-2) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. 
The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument 
validity. m1 is a test for first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m3 is a test for third-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 
5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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J (p-value)  0.05  0.66  0.03  0.81  0.04  0.74  0.05  0.62  0.06  0.02 
m1  -2.86  -6.38  -6.54  -2.51  -7.13  -0.52  -7.14  -1.02  -3.97  -7.11 
m3  1.60  2.48  2.58  0.02  1.90  1.99  2.35  0.90  1.32  2.08 
                     
p-value of  F-test of  
H0: cash flow coeff.  ≥1 
 
0.00  0.77  0.55  0.02  0.26  0.06  0.95  0.21  0.99  0.95 
Diff  0.003    0.07    0.27    0.11    0.00   
                     
Observations 
 
37,084  121,897  143,254  15,727  147,066  11,915  157,766  1,215  43,652  115,329 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. In columns 1 and 2, TYPEit is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm is located in the coastal regions of China, and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, TYPEit is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has an average share of foreign capital of more than 
10%, and 0 otherwise. In columns 5 and 6, TYPEit is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has an average share of state capital of more than 10%, and 0 otherwise. In columns 7 and 8, TYPEit is a 
dummy equal to 1 if firm i is affiliated with the state and/or provincial governments, and 0 otherwise. In columns 9 and 10, TYPEit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s assets growth to cash flow 
sensitivity (CFS) falls in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the CFS of all firms in the sample, and 0 otherwise.  CFS represents the firm-specific assets growth to cash flow 
sensitivities calculated using the methodology outlined in Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009).Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all 
specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-3) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). Time 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m3 
is a test for third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Diff is the p-value associated with the F-test 
for the equality of the cash flow coefficients for firms characterized by TYPE equal to 0 and 1. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at 
the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Table 10: Firm characteristic by firm-specific cash flow sensitivity (CFS) type 
 
   











































































0.00  8.80 
(6.09) 
0.04  8.71 
(6.12) 
0.43 




0.00  40.08 
(23.55) 




































0.20  11.46 
(8.92) 
0.00  11.76 
(8.89) 
0.60 




0.08  0.08 
(0.02) 
0.09  0.09 
(0.02) 
0.07 




0.48  16.29 
(14.80) 



































0.00  13.50 
(12.46) 








0.10  442.33 
(344.12) 
0.00  410.17 
(322.91) 
0.00 





0.00  15.88 
(13.71) 
0.00  14.90 
(14.06) 
0.05 
Number of observations  43,652  115,329 
 
  9,722    26,860   
 
Note: CFS represents the firm-specific assets growth to cash flow sensitivities calculated using the methodology outlined in Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009). The Table reports means and medians (in parenthesis). 
All figures are in percentage terms. Firms with high CFS are defined as firms whose CFS falls in the top quartile of the distribution of the CFS of all firms in the sample. Firms with low CFS are defined as firms whose 
CFS falls in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the CFS of all firms in the sample. The statistics reported in Panel B refer to firms with high growth, defined as firms whose average assets growth falls in the 
top quartile of the distribution of the average assets growth of all firms in the sample. Diff is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A. Diff1 is the p-value 
of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in column (2) of Panel A and column (1) of Panel B. Diff2 is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in columns (1) and (3) of 
Panel B. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 49 
 
 Table  A1:  Assets  growth  model  augmented  with  industry-specific  time 
dummies: using an IV fixed effects estimator  
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Kleibergen-Paap  rk Wald F- 
statistic 
 
12.43  39.59  28.70  7.83 
Observations 
 
11,759  30,964  98,083  18,002 
 
Notes: The  figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies  and time dummies 
interacted  with  industry  dummies  were  included  in  all  specifications.  Standard  errors  and  test  statistics  are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in columns 1, 2, and 3 are (Assets growth)i(t-3) and (Cash 
flow / total assets)i(t-3). Instruments in column 4 are (Assets growth)i(t-2) and (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3). Time 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. The 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic, which is the robust analog of the F-statistic form of the Cragg-Donald (1993) 
statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) is used as a global test for the presence of weak instruments. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. 
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Table A2: Assets growth model augmented with industry-specific time dummies 
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J (p-value)  0.94  0.02 
m1  -3.45  -7.03 
m3  1.97  1.69 
     
Diff  0.00   
 
p-value of  F-test of  








     
Observations 
 
44,169  114,812 
 
Notes: CFS
alt represents the firm-specific assets growth to cash flow sensitivities calculated using the methodology 
outlined in Hovakimian (2009). Firms with high CFS
alt are defined as firms whose CFS
alt falls in the top quartile 
of the distribution of the CFS
alt of all firms in the sample. Firms with low CFS
alt are defined as firms whose CFS
alt 
falls in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the CFS
alt of all firms in the sample. All specifications were 
estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard 
errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications. 
Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are 
(Assets  growth)i(t-3),  (Cash  flow /  total  assets)i(t-3).  Time  dummies and  time  dummies interacted  with  industry 
dummies were always included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, 
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. m3 is a test 
for third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null  of  no  serial  correlation.  Diff  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  F-test  for  the  equality  of  the  cash  flow 
coefficients for firms characterized by high and low CFS
alt.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
  Table A3: Firm characteristic by firm-specific cash flow sensitivity (CFS
alt) type  
 
   















































































0.00  8.98 
(6.24) 
0.00  8.65 
(6.08) 
0.02 




0.21  40.82 
(24.04) 




































0.60  12.05 
(9.18) 
0.00  11.54 
(8.78) 
0.39 




0.68  0.09 
(0.02) 
0.77  0.09 
(0.02) 
0.64 




0.86  16.86 
(15.41) 




































0.99  14.55 
(13.48) 








0.00  447.10 
(348.08) 
0.00  408.61 
(321.74) 
0.00 





0.17  17.02 
(14.57) 
0.00  14.51 
(13.80) 
0.05 
Number of observations  44,169  114,812 
 
  9,607    26,975   
 
Note: CFS
alt represents the firm-specific assets growth to cash flow sensitivities calculated using the methodology outlined in Hovakimian (2009). The Table reports means and medians (in parenthesis). All figures are 
in percentage terms. Firms with high CFS
alt are defined as firms whose CFS
alt falls in the top quartile of the distribution of the CFS
alt of all firms in the sample. Firms with low CFS
alt are defined as firms whose CFS
alt 
falls in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the CFS
alt of all firms in the sample. The statistics reported in Panel B refer to firms with high growth, defined as firms whose average assets growth falls in the 
top quartile of the distribution of the average assets growth of all firms in the sample. Diff is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A. Diff1 is the p-value 
of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in column (2) of Panel A and column (1) of Panel B. Diff2 is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of the means reported in columns (1) and (3) of 
Panel B. See Appendix 1 for precise definitions of all variables. 52 
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